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FRoM ToRT LIHBmrmiN K TuCPlaintiff was a third floor tenant in an apartment building that had
been devised jointly to the defendant charitable corporation to be
used for its charitable purposes. The building was rented for commercial purposes, and the income from the property was devoted to
defendant charity. Plaintiff sustained serious injury in the course of a
fire that swept the building and instituted suit to recover for personal
injuries allegedly caused by defendant's negligence in failing to provide adequate and safe exit ways and fire escapes as required by a
Louisville ordinance and a state statute. Summary judgment was
rendered for defendant on the basis of its affidavit alleging that the
property was held in trust, that the income was devoted to the defendant's charitable endeavor, and invoking its immunity from liability
for torts. Held: reversed and remanded for a trial on the facts. Due
to a combination of three major factors, namely: (1) corporate negligence in failing to perform a statutory duty, (2) merely income producing property, and (3) injuries to a stranger to the charities, the
plea of immunity is not available to the defendant. Roland v. Catholic
Archdiocese of Louisville, 301 S.W. 2d 574 (Ky. 1957).
Charitable immunity was first adopted in this country by Massachusetts,' though to establish the doctrine the court relied on English3
precedents2 which had already been repudiated in that country.
Later, a great majority of courts in this country accepted and adopted
the doctrine of charitable immunity, and for many years it sailed along
on a sea of various reasons for its existence and application. 4 Basically,
the reasons flowed from the courts' determination of public policy: that
public policy demanded charities be clothed in immunity from torts
to prevent dissipation of their funds-the so-called trust fund theory5
-and to foster their operations to the benefit of society.
In recent years, however, the increasing attack by writers and the
courts on charitable immunity has resulted in a modem trend of decision to reject the immunity or limit its scope.6 In doing this, the
TORTS-CHA=rABLE Imnmrry

1 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876); Maryland also adopted the doctrine in an early case, Perry v. The House of Refuge, 63
Md. 20 (1885); evidently neither court realized that the authorities they relied on
had been repudiated.
2 See Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507, 513, 8 Eng.
Rep. 1508, 1510 (1846), in which the "trust fund theory" was expounded; "To
give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom
the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose." (dictum). See also, Holliday v. St. Leonard, Shoreditch, 11 C.B.
(N.S.) 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
See Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. Cas. 686, 720, 782-734 (1866).
4 Annot., 25 A.L.R. 2d 29 (1952).
5 See note 2 supra.
62 Harper and James, Torts see. 29.17 (1956 ed.); Prosser, Torts 784-788
(2d ed. 1955); 25 A.L.R. 2d 43-44 (1952).
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courts have either rejected 7 and overruled the doctrine completely, or
created various exceptions to its application, thereby limiting its scope.
Some of the more important exceptions where liability has been imposed are: (1) if the injured party is a stranger to the charities, or
(2) if the activity engaged in by the charity is commercial in character,
or (3) if the negligence charged is a breach of statutory duties, or (4)
if the charity was guilty of administrative negligence as opposed to the
negligence of one of its employees. 8 Courts which have rejected the
doctrine completely or have created exceptions to limit its scope generally say that the original policy reasons for the doctrine have disappeared. Although charities were weak in their infancy, they have
now blossomed into big businesses capable of insuring themselves
against liability and thereby spreading the risk, rather than allowing
the damages to fall on the innocent parties who were injured.
The Kentucky Court recognized charitable immunity in an early
case,9 relying specifically on a Maryland case' ° which had based its
decision on repudiated English precedents. Kentucky, in a line of
cases'1 through Forrestv. Red Cross Hospital,12 has been listed among
those states allowing "complete immunity." 3 The reasons for immunity asserted by the court were: (1) public policy, (2) prevention
of dissipation of the trust funds of the charity, and (3) implied waiver
of negligence or assumption of risk by the injured party. In the Red
Cross Hospital case, the court in a four to three opinion denied recovery to a paying patient at a charitable hospital for the negligence
of an employee. In that case judge Sims, speaking for the majority, 14
listed the previous reasons for immunity and vigorously asserted that
7President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942). The devastating opinion of judge Rutledge gave impetus to the
modem trend of decision to reject charitable immunity.
8Annot., 25 A.L.R. 2d 112-138 (1952).
9Williamson v. Louisville Industrial School of Reform, 95 Ky. 251, 24 S.W.
1065 (1894).
10 Perry v. The House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885).

11 Averback v. Y.M.C.A. of Covington, 250 Ky. 34, 61 S.W. 2d 1066 (1933);

Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick, 223 Ky. 355,
3 S.W. 2d 753, 62 A.L.R. 721 (1928) (recovery denied for death of a paying
resident even though the defendant had insurance coverage); Emery v. Jewish
Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921) (recovery deniedto an employee); Cook v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S.W. 874
(1918) (recovery denied to a paying patient). See also Pikeville Methodist Hospital v. Donahoo, 221 Ky. 538, 299 S.W. 159 (1927); Illinois Central R. Co. v.
Buchanan, 126 Ky. 288, 103 S.W. 272, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 711 (1907); University

of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 784
(1907).
12265 S.W. 2d 80 (Ky. 1954); Cammack, Moremen and Combs, JJ., dissenting.
13 See Annot., 25 A.L.R. 2d 158 (1952).
14 Sims, Milliken and Stewart, JJ., who were in the majority and are members
of the present court, joined in the unanimous decision in the Roland case.
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to take away the immunity of charitable institutions from tort actions
would saddle them with ruinous insurance premiums. A substantial
minority of the court dissented without opinion. Whether the minority
thought the time had come to overrule the doctrine or to limit its scope
in some way, perhaps by classifying a paying patient as a stranger to
the charities, does not appear.
Then came the Roland case, where the Court in a unanimous
opinion imposed liability on the defendant charity. The opinion, by
Commissioner Stanley, emphasized the concurrence of three major
factors in the case, each of which has been made the sole basis for
exceptions to the application of charitable immunity in some other
jurisdictions.' 5 These factors or exceptions were: (1) the allegations
were of corporate negligence in violating a statutory duty, (2) the
property concerning which there was negligence was commercial
property, the income from which was devoted to the charities, and (3)
the injured person was a stranger to the charities. Also, in the course
of the opinion the Court pointed to the availability of liability insurance to protect such institutions from liability for negligence, and
recognized that in the beginning charities were of limited means, but
now bad grown to have large funds with which to carry on their
activities. It is evident that in the Roland case the Court agreed that the
time had come for a re-evaluation of charitable immunity. Such reevaluation could either call for the complete reversal of the whole
doctrine, or for the creation of exceptions limiting the scope of its application. Obviously, the Court utilized the latter approach by recognizing three exceptions and imposing liability on the charity where all
three were present.
In a recent case, 16 the Kansas court found itself in a similar situation
to that of the Kentucky Court in the Roland case. Previously Kansas
had been characterized as a "complete immunity" jurisdiction,lT but
in holding a charitable hospital liable for the negligence of its employee
in causing the death of a patient, that court for all practical purposes
completely overruled the doctrine of charitable immunity. In so doing
the court suggested liability insurance and, like the Kentucky Court in
the Roland case, recognized that charities now have grown into big
businesses capable of insuring themselves and thereby protecting
their funds.
What then, is the effect of the recognition of exceptions to the application of the doctrine of charitable immunity and the reasoning in
15 See note 8 supra.
16 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954).
17 See Annot., 25 A.L.R. 2d 157, 158 (1952).
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the Roland case, upon the reasons for immunity the Court has asserted
in previous cases? It appears that the reasons for the immunity have
become hollow in the face of the exceptions to its application the court
recognized in the Roland case. The Court had previously asserted
immunity to protect the trust funds of a charity, but allowing a
stranger to the charities to recover is just as much a dissipation of the
trust funds as allowing a charity patient to recover. 8 In the past, the
Court has denied recovery to a paying patient and even an employee
of the charity on the grounds that this constitutes a dissipation of the
trust funds. 19 It seems that an employee of a charity or a paying
patient is, in most respects, as much a stranger to the charities as the
plaintiff in the Roland case. Insurance coverage, suggested by the
Court itself, will constitute a dissipation of the trust funds due to the
payment of premiums. To allow a plaintiff to recover on the grounds
that the activity engaged in by the charity is commercial in character,
is nonetheless a dissipation of the trust funds.
The fact that the Court pointed to the availability of liability insurance and recognized that charitable institutions now have large funds
with which to carry on their activities, also tends to show that a
re-evaluation of the public policy behind charitable immunity has been
made since the decision in Forrest v. Red Cross Hospital, where the
Court rejected the idea of insurance on the grounds that it would
saddle charitable institutions with ruinous premiums. Also, it cannot
be assumed that the Court, on the facts of the Roland case alone, was
suggesting liability insurance as a means to cover the liability imposed.
Lastly, had the policy of protecting the trust funds of a charity
had any vitality at the time of the Roland case, it could have been reaffirmed by holding that the plaintiff impliedly waived the negligence
of the charity; this being a reason for immunity the Court had asserted
in previous cases. Therefore, it seems that the exceptions to the application of immunity and the reasoning of the Court in the Roland
case have for all practical purposes eviscerated the reasons asserted for
applying charitable immunity.
In conclusion, the result and reasoning in the Roland case is more
in line with the modem trend of decision to either overrule the doctrine
of charitable immunity or, by creating exceptions, to limit the scope
of its application. The reasoning in the case tends to show that a reevaluation of the public policy behind the whole doctrine of immunity
has been made, and that in the future more liability will be imposed
18 Cf. Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 55 So. 2d 142, 153 (1951).

19 Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577

1921);

Cook v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S.W. 874 (1918).
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on charitable institutions in Kentucky. So far as the decision places
Kentucky among those states which adhere to some sort of partial
liability, the result will create confusion as to what the law will be in
the future, plus expensive litigation. Therefore, it appears that the
reasons the Court has asserted for immunity have been repudiated by
the exceptions to its application, and the better approach would seem
to be a clear reversal of the doctrine of charitable immunity in Kentucky.
H. Wendell Cherry

